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Best known as the editor-in-chief of the monumental Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Paul
Edwards (1923-2004) was a modern philosophe. Like the Enlightenment writers he
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philosophers connected with that particular Logical Positivist movement. As a
Positivist of sorts himself, he had no love for philosophers whom he considered to lack
clarity, and like the philosophes—especially Voltaire, whose work he anthologized in a
volume entitled Voltaire Selections—he had a gift for using biting humor to attack
those with whom he disagreed. One of his foremost targets was Søren Kierkegaard,
whom he considered to be the very model for how one should not do philosophy. While
he referred several times in his writings and lectures to Kierkegaard's life and work,
Edwards' best-known critique is found in the 1971 article "Kierkegaard and the 'Truth'
of Christianity," published in Philosophy: The Journal of the Royal Institute of
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I. Paul Edwards

Best known as the editor-in-chief of the monumental Encyclopedia of Philosophy,
Paul Edwards (1923-2004) was a modem philosophe. Like the Enlightenment
writers he himself so admired, Voltaire, Diderot, and D' Alembert, he spent his career
defending the ideas of rationalism, freethought, materialism, and the application of
scientific methodology to philosophy. Jn addition, deeply influenced by the Vienna
Circle, he used his editorship of the Encyclopedia to keep alive the memories of many
of the philosophers connected with that particular Logical Positivist movement. As
a Positivist of sorts himself, he had no love for philosophers whom he considered
to lack clarity, and like the philosophes-especially Voltaire, whose work he
anthologized in a volume entitled Voltaire Selections 1-he had a gift for using biting
humor to attack those with whom he disagreed. One of his foremost targets was
S0ren Kierkegaard, whom he considered to be the very model for how one should
not do philosophy. While he referred several times in his writings and lectures to
Kierkegaard's life and work, Edwards' best-known critique is found in the 1971
article "Kierkegaard and the 'Truth' of Christianity," published in Philosophy: The
Journal of the Royal Institute ofPhilosophy.'
Paul Edwards (whose original name was "Eisenstein") was born to well-todo Jewish parents in Vienna, Austria on September 2, 1923, the yonngest of three
brothers. Austria was in a state ofiurrnoil during this time, and there was great unrest
among the citizenry, particularly regarding the intentions of Germany. A gifted
student, he was admitted to the prestigious Akademisches Gymnasium. But after
the Nazi armexation of Austria in 1938 his parents sent him to stay with friends in
Scotland. He later joined his family in Melbourne, Australia, where they had fled
to avoid the horrors of the Holocaust, and where they changed their surname to
"Edwards" to disguise their Jewish origins-for even in that country so far from

Voltaire: Selections, ed. by Paul Edwards, New York: Macmillan Publishing Co. 1989

(Great Philosophers).
Paul Edwards, "Kierkegaard and the 'Truth' of Christianity," Philosophy: The Journal
of the Royallnstitute ofPhilosophy. vol. 46, no. 176, 1971, pp. 89-108.
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Hitler's reach they feared the implications of anti-Semitism. While in Australia
Edwards continued io explore analytic philosophy, which he had first gleaned as
a precocious young man in Austria. He had been intrigued by the views of Moritz
Schlick (1882-1936), often called the founding father of the Vienna Circle, whose
assassination by a former student and member of the Austrian Nazi Party was a topic
Edwards often mentioned, feeling that above all else Schlick had never received the
recognition that was due him for his work on Logical Positivism.
Edwards studied philosophy at the University of Melbourne and was much
influenced by the analytic tradition that held sway there. He received his B.A. (1944)
and M.A, (1946) in philosophy at the University of Melbourne. After World War
II he originally intended to do further studies in the United Kingdom, but decided
to complete a doctorate in philosophy at Columbia University in New York City
after being offered a lectureship there. He did postgraduate teaching at Columbia
after completing his dissertation and was to spend the rest of his life in New York
City, becoming a professor at such institutions as New York University, the New
School for Social Research, and Brooklyn College. In 1979 he received the Nicholas
Murray Butler Silver Medal for distinguished contributions to philosophy from
Columbia University.
Edwards published several articles relating to analytic philosophy, and also
became a friend and editor of Bertrand Russell, arguably the founding father of that
particular movement. Edwards had originally contacted him in 1947, shortly after
Russell's return to England from an unhappy time in the United States, where he
had been denied a position at the College of the City of New York because of his
radical views on religion and morality. In 1957 Edwards would edit a collection of
Russell's previously scattered writings dealing with religion, entitled Why I Am Not
a Christian and Other Essays, which became a seminal work in the promotion of
unbelief and which has never gone out of print. There is a long afterword written by
Edwards on the City College case,' which he considered to be a gross violation of
Russell's civil rights and a miscarriage of justice in general.
Edwards is primarily known for editing the Encyclopedia ofPhilosophy, which
originally appeared in 1966. With its 1,500 entries and nearly 500 contributors,
most of whom constituted a veritable "Who's Who" of contemporary philosophers
themselves, it remains the essential reference work for the field of philosophy. While
he authored many other books and articles, his name will forever be synonymous
with this particular work, for which he wrote several entries himself. Using his
editorial prerogative, Edwards made sure that there were plentiful entries on atheism,
positivism, materialism, and critiques of God's existence, and he himself co-wrote
the long entry on his own philosophical hero, Bertrand Russell. However, very aware
of his own biases, he made it a point to try to find what he considered to be the best
experts in the field to write entries on the various figures and topics iliscussed in the
encyclopedia, and attempted to be scrupulously fair to those philosophers he himself
disagreed with. Whether he was successful in this remains a bone of contention.
Paul Edwards, "How Bertrand Russell Was Prevented From Teaching at the College
of the City of New York," appendix to Bertrand Russell, Why I Am Not a Christian and Other
Essays on Religion and Related Subjects, New York: Simon and Schuster 1957, pp. 207-59.
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For instance, the entry on Kierkegaard in the Encyclopedia was written by Alasdair
Macintyre, whose own interpretation of Kierkegaard has been the subject of much
debate. 4
Those who knew Edwards will always remember his erudition and his wicked
sense of humor. An admirer ofVoltaire and Russell for their great wit as well as their
philosophical acumen, Edwards had a special fondness for the life and works of
David Hume, the man he considered to be the best exemplar of a learned individual
who lived life to the fullest and who remained to the day of his death a cheerful
nonbeliever. He particularly admired Hume's clarity, and his willingness to expose
what Edwards considered the nonsensical implications of metaphysical speculation.
His own skeptical views regarding morality, human knowledge, and religious belief
were quite close to Hume's, which did not always jibe well with his more Positivistic
leanings. Edwards never married but, like his hero Hume, he reputedly had many
lady friends throughout his life, and was something of a bon vivant himself. His
dinner parties in the 1960s were legendary. They brought together many leading
intellectuals, including those then writing entries for the Encyclopedia ofPhilosophy,
and were a sort of modern-day salon.
Shortly before his death, Edwards published a collection of essays entitled
Heidegger's Confasions,' dedicated to demolishing the legacy of the man whom
Edwards considered to have done the greatest damage to the field of philosophy
in the twentieth century. The book brought together five essays he had previously
published, with such titles as "Heidegger's Quest for Being" and "Double-Talk
about Life after Death." He especially abhorred Heidegger's confusing writings on
the nature of death and his cryptic comment that "Only a God can save us."6 For
Edwards, such an expression was beneath contempt. Moreover, he put Heidegger's
approach to philosophy in direct line of descent from Kierkegaard, and made it a
point to compare the two men's views on the topic of human existence, stating that
"we are assured that Kierkegaard, Heidegger, and other existentialists have achieved
a proper understanding of death."7 For Edwards, this was the height of nonsense,
and while the bulk of the book takes Heidegger to task for such a claim, he clearly
considers Kierkegaard to be equally culpable.
Edwards also wrote a biting critique of reincarnation, entitled Reincarnation: A
Critical Examination, 8 in which he scornfully looked at both popular and esoteric
attempts to describe human existence after death. Interestingly enough, he makes
only one reference to Kierkegaard in the book, and that a positive one. When
discussing parapsychologist Ian Stevenson's writings on reincarnation, Edwards
remarks: "a rational person will conclude either that Stevenson's reports are seriously
See, for instance, Kierkegaard After Macintyre, ed. by John Davenport and Anthony

Rudd, Chicago: Open Court 2001.
5
Paul Edwards, Heidegger S Confasions, Amherst, New York: Prometheus Books
2004.

Martin Heidegger, ..Nur noch ein Gott kann uns retten," Der Spiegel, vol. 30, May
1976, pp. 193-219.

Paul Edwards, "Heidegger and Death," in Heideggers Confusions, p. 65.
Paul Edwards, Reincarnation: A Critical Examination, Amherst, New York:
Prometheus Books 1996.

7
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defective or that his alleged facts can be explained without bringing in reincarnation.
An acceptance of the collateral assumptions would, to borrow a phrase from S0ren

Kierkegaard, amount to the 'crucifixion' of our intellects.''9
The volume which Edwards co-edited with Arthur Pap, A Modern Introduction
to Philosophy, went into three editions. It contained copious selections from such
unbelievers as Paul Ree, John Stuart Mill, Clarence Darrow, Bertrand Russell, David
Hume, Ernest Nagel, and A.J. Ayer, as well as Edwards' own insightful introductions
and annotations. Yet there are many selections from philosophers with whom
Edwards disagreed, especially in Chapter V, "On the Existence of God," including
St. Anselm, Thomas Aquinas, F.C. Copleston, John Hick, and Kierkegaard, with
long selections from Book I, Chapter I and Book II, Part II, Chapters I and II of the
Concluding Unscientific Postscript.
Never one to hide his own unbelief, Edwards often commented that his two main
goals as a philosopher were to demolish the influence of Heidegger and keep alive
the memory of Wilhelm Reich, the much-reviled psychoanalyst whose critiques of
religion Edwards felt remained valid. He had undergone therapy with Reich himself
in the late 1940s, and continued to practice various Reichian techniques throughout
his life. While his admiration for Reich was considered by his friends to be one of
his personal quirks, Edwards always made it clear that he considered Reich to be one
of the world's foremost critics of organized religion. He shared Reich's view that
religion had caused much more harm than good by alienating people from the natural
world and from understanding their own natural selves. For all their philosophical
differences, this was a point of view shared by such disparate figures as Voltaire,
Hume, Nietzsche, Freud, Russell, and, of course, Edwards himself. Edwards always
made it clear that he was not only a nonbeliever, but someone with a visceral dislike
for religion. Shortly before his death he was gladdened to know of the rise of what
has come to be called "The New Atheism," identified with such thinkers as Daniel C.
Dennett, Christopher Hitchens, and Richard Dawkins, all of whose work he closely
followed in such publications as The New York Review of Books, The Nation, and
The Times Literary Supplement. These and many other newspapers, thoroughly
annotated in his often indecipherable handwriting, would be found throughout his
huge book-laden apartment in the Apthorp at 390 West End Avenue on the Upper
West Side of Manhattan, where he was known by everyone as "the Professor" and
where he lived for the last thirty years of his life.
A hard-headed realist with a concern for the proper use of language, Edwards
despised philosophers-particularly so-called "existentialists"-who, he felt,
engaged in deliberate obfuscations to cloud their real meanings. Death is not, as
Heidegger would put it, "our capital possibility"10-it is the end of one's existence.
Or, as Bertrand Russell once so memorably put it: "When I die, I shall rot and
nothing of my ego will survive."" It is perhaps not surprising that one of the entries
that Edwards personally wrote for The Encyclopedia of Philosophy was entitled
Paul Edwards, "More about Dr. Ian Stevenson, the 'Galileo of Reincarnation,' " in
Reincarnation: A Critical Examination, p. 255.
10

11

Paul Edwards, "Heidegger and Death," inHeidegger:S- Confusions, p. 78.
Bertrand Russell, What I Believe, New York: Routledge 2004, p. 13.
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Death. " 12

"My
Like Epicurus, what he most feared was not eternal punishment or
reincarnation into another body, but rather a long and painful demise. Mercifully,
while his health issues did cause him much distress (particularly severe aud recurring
back pain which originated from his falling from a ladder in his apartment while
retrieving a book on a high shelf), he did not, as he had dreaded, spend his last days
in a hospital, but died in his living room while reading-a very Epicurean way to go.
Paul Edwards died on December 9, 2004. His final book, entitled God and the
Philosophers, a summation of the views ofmany ofthe major Western philosophers on
the subject of the deity, was published posthumously. 13 He worked on it continuously
for the last decade of his life, rewriting each chapter obsessively. Given his mauy
health problems, which led to his having to---much against his desires-retire from
teaching (the genuine love of his life), he rightly suspected that this would be the last
book he would work on. He was loath to complete it, knowing that it was unlikely
he would have the energy to devote to starting a new project. However, Edwards was
assured by his literary executor that the book would appear, aud he was glad to know
that it would likely place him in the company of the "New Atheism" movement
whose writers had all been influenced by his own lifelong defense of materialism
and rationalism. It finally appeared in 2009, five years after his death.
II. Edwards' Critique ofKierkegaard
Given Edwards' animus towards Kierkegaard's approach to philosophy, one
might be surprised to learn that he wrote a not unsympathetic short biography of
Kierkegaard in his widely-used textbook, A Modern Introduction to Philosophy. 14
Interestingly enough, it is by far the longest entry on all the philosophers whose
works are excerpted in that text. Edwards was fascinated by Kierkegaard's tortured
life, especially his unsuccessful romantic endeavors and his painful relationships
with the Danish State Church. Furthermore, he considered him to be the precursor
to the existentialist movement which played such a dominant role in the Western
World following World War II. Kierkegaard's analysis of guilt and dread, Edwards

writes, c'and his discussions of the ways in which human beings seek to avoid taking
ultimate decisions concerning their lives have strongly influenced the philosophies
of Heidegger and Sartre. " 15
Jn his introduction to Chapter Five, "On The Existence of God," Edwards
discusses Kierkegaard's views on "the absolute paradox" of the Incarnation aud why
it is disturbing to both theists and critics of theism:
"
Paul Edwards, "My Death" in The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, vols. 1-8, ed. by
Paul Edwards, New York: Free Press and Macmillan Pnblishing Company 1966, vol. 5, pp.
416-419.
13
Paul Edwards, God and the Philosophers, ed. by Timothy J. Madigan, Amherst, New
York: Prometheus Books 2009.
14
Paul Edwards, "Smen Aabye Kierkegaard," Biographical Note, in A Modern
Introduction to Philosophy, ed. by Paul Edwards and Arthur Pap, New York: Free Press 1957,
pp. 588-92.
IS

Ibid., p. 588.
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Kierkegaard had no time for theologians who tried to explain away difficulties and thus
"shirk something of the pain and crisis of decision." Kierkegaard did not indeed think
that the evidence against the existence of God was stronger than the favorable evidence,
but he did regard belief in the ..absolute paradox" (the incarnation of God in the person
of Jesus) as "absurd." While it is not entirely clear what he meant by this, it is certain that
Kierkegaard regarded belief in the incarnation as highly objectionable from a logical or
rational point of view. He nevertheless taught that faith in the absolute paradox was both
possible and highly desirable. The person who has this faith achieves the highest kind of
life attainable for human beings. Moreover it is only by attaining such faith that one can
become a Christian and only a Christian can gain eternal happiness. To be told that one
ought to believe something although or perhaps even because it is "logically repellent"
sounds like strange advice, but it is an essential part of Kierkegaard's defense of
Christianity and it is intimately connected with his doctrine, celebrated by contemporary
existentialists as a major contribution to human thought, that ''truth is subjectivity." 16

The notion attributed to Kierkegaard that "truth is subjectivity" is dealt with in
detail below, in the discussion of Edwards' 1971 Philosophy article. There is also a
chapter on "Fideism" in Edwards' final, posthumously published work God and the
Philosophers, in which the views above are further explicated. But there are only
three fleeting references to Kierkegaard himself in that book, perhaps because its
emphasis is on philosophers who were nonbelievers and/or critics of theism rather
than on theism's defenders.
In the chapter on "Fideism" Edwards makes a direct connection between
Kierkegaard's "leap of faith" concept and William James' essay "The Will to
Believe"-a rather uncharitable comparison, since James goes to some trouble in
the essay itself to differentiate his views from those of Kierkegaard. Edwards writes:
This new interpretation of the idea of"truth" has been hailed as a momentous contribution
to philosophy and religion. A little reflection shows, however, that it is nothing but a
confusing redefinition. From the fact that a person sincerely and passionately believes in
God, it does not follow that there is a God, and the disagreement between the believer
and the unbeliever obviously concerns the latter question. As we shall see shortly,
Kierkegaard's attempt to save religion by redefining truth reappears in William James,
and Kierkegaard is a forerunner of various contemporary philosophers who deny that
there is such a thing as objective truth. 17

One might expect Edwards to criticize Kierkegaard more in his various writings,
given his unsympathetic attitude toward fideism and existentialism, both of which
he strongly identified with Kierkegaard. The best reason for such a lack of written
references is most probably due to the fact that he thought the bulk of his specific
criticisms against the Dane and his influence could be found in his article "Kierkegaard
and the 'Truth' of Christianity" which appeared, as previously mentioned, in the
April 1971 edition of Philosophy: The Journal of the Royal Institute ofPhilosophy.

16

Paul Edwards, "Fideism," in A Modern Introduction to Philosophy, p. 505.
Paul Edwards, "Fideisrn," in God and the Philosophers, pp. 165--6.
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Often anthologized, a slightly edited version of the article appears in his A Modern
Introduction to Philosophy as well. 18
What are the main points of the article? Edwards begins by using the phrase
"The Alleged Turning Point" in European Philosophy to describe Kierkegaard's
major contribution. Modern-day followers of such thinkers as Martin Heidegger and

Karl Jaspers, he writes, have initiated a campaign against "scientism,"' '"scientific
rationalism," and "'positivism" as defective and inadequate ways of arriving at truth,
and utilize Kierkegaard's writings to provide an alternative route to truth. As one of
the last great defenders of Positivism himself, these were fighting words for Edwards,
who in the essay devotes the hulk of his argument to attempting to prove that there
is only one kind of truth, "objective scientific truth." Kierkegaard's writings do not
mark a turning point in the understanding of the nature of truth, but rather a retreat
from rationality and, perhaps an even worse cardinal sin in Edwards' view, a misuse
oflanguage by redefining the meaning of"truth" itself.
Most of the examples used in the article come from the Concluding Unscientific
Postscript. Edwards points out that be is fully aware that attributing the views of
Johannes Climacus to Kierkegaard himself is highly problematic, and he admits
that he is not qualified enough in Kierkegaard scholarship to make a learned
judgment on this. But since most of the existentialist writers he quotes do attribute
the concept of "truth as subjectivity" to Kierkegaard rather than to characters
created by Kierkegaard, Edwards feels entitled to do the same. "I am concerned
with the soundness or otherwise of the doctrine that truth is subjectivity as it has
been interpreted by contemporary existentialists who regard it as a momentous
contribution," he writes. "Whether or bow far Kierkegaard himselfreally believed it
or any of the other theories proposed in the pseudonymous writings is quite another
matter." 19
As far as Edwards could see, Kierkegaard's underlying concerns with objective
scientific truth were due to the fact that he desired certainty, and science cannot give
this. There were three basic inadequacies of using the scientific method to arrive
at certainty. First, it relies upon probability, which can only give approximation,
and which furthermore has no connection with "passion." Probable knowledge
cannot impel someone to believe. Second, science does not give evidence for or
against the truths of religion. For instance, no matter what evidence one relies upon,
the question of the existence of God cannot be proven or disproven. And third,
the specific doctrines of Christianity, the religion that Kierkegaard is passionately
committed to, are by scientific standards literally "absurd." Kierkegaard's defense
of the subjective truth concept is therefore an amalgamation of all three criticisms
directed against science. Edwards adds:
It is unnecessary for our purposes to inquire into the sense or senses in which

Kierkegaard uses "absurd," "breach with all thinking," and similar expressions ....
Whatever their exact meaning, there is no doubt that Kierkegaard regarded the doctrine
18

Paul Edwards, "Kierkegaard and the 'Truth' of Christianity," in A Modern Introduction

to Philosophy, pp. 505-22.
19

Paul Edwards, "Kierkegaard and the 'Truth' of Christianity," Philosophy: The Journal

ofthe Roya/Institute ofPhilosophy, vol. 46, no. 176, 1971,p. 108.
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of the incarnation as highly objectionable from the point of view of reason so that it
would have to be rejected if it were simply a matter of rational Considerations. 20

One senses in reading the essay that Edwards is not really so willing to overlook the
exact meaning of such terms, since another ofhis arguments is that Kierkegaard opens
up a philosophical floodgate by both changing the common meaning of terms and
allowing the usage of vague and ambiguous definitions--the very sort oflinguistic
inexactitude that would set a Positivist on edge. Nonetheless, by then focusing on the
central concept of the Incarnation-which Edwards stresses is Kierkegaard's main
objective in his goal to redefine "truth"-the essay returns to the question asked at
its beginning: is this really a "turning point" or rather a return to a confusing way of
talking that the Vienna Circle and other linguistic philosophers had sought to rectify?
Here Edwards focuses on what does seem to be a genuine contribution in
Kierkegaard's thought: an elaborate attempt to expla.in the difference between what
is believed (which Kierkegaard is willing to grant is "objective content") and how
this is believed, which relates to the subjective attitude of the believer. Edwards
concurs that this can be a fruitful avenue to pursue, especially by focusing on the
question of"what is believed." He writes:
Kierkegaard here evidently thinks of the kind of situation in which we might agree with
what a particular person is saying and yet find it odd and even distasteful that he of all

people, should be saying it. Sometimes we might even refer to such people as "living lies"
although what they say is quite true or the sort of thing that we ourselves approve of. 21

Edwards gives the example of theologians who talk a great deal about "love" but
seem to be cold and uncaring individuals themselves.
Yet, while this topic, which relates to the field of the ethics of belief, is a rich one
to investigate, there does not seem to be anything new to it added by Kierkegaard's
writings. Furthermore, it is the second half, relating to "how one believes," that seems
to be more pertinent to Kierkegaard's defense of subjectivity. But here, too, Edwards
argues, Kierkegaard makes no great contribution to understanding the nature of
truth itself, _but rather develops in great detail the concept of "faith." Kierkegaard's
understanding of "faith" does indeed seem to be radically different from that of
many other writers in the Christian tradition, especially the view that there can be
no such thing as faith without risk. Edwards writes: "It is risk which gives faith
the kind of tension that Kierkegaard regards as extremely desirable. A feeling of
security is neither admirable nor any indication that the person has attained the right
God-relationship."" But the emphasis on "insecurity" as a necessary stage of belief,
as well as the related famous concept of the "leap of faith," are matters of debate
regarding levels of commitment, rather than-as Kierkegaard's defenders claimsaying anything central to the concept of truth itself.
Edwards then adds that Kierkegaard argues for two senses of being "in the
truth"-an objective and a subjective sense. Kierkegaard insists that science has
20

Ibid., p. 92.
Ibid., p. 93.
Ibid., p. 94.
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"demoralized" people by only stressing the first, which tries to provide logical
arguments that will allow a person to calmly and carefully commit to a belief, based
upon preponderance of evidence and a satisfactory chain of reasoning. But it is
only in the subjective sense of "being in the truth" that there is actual decisiveness.
It is clear, Edwards points out, why this view would appeal to theologians who
recognize-thanks primarily to the devastating logical critiques of David Hume and
Immanuel Kant-the flaws in the traditional arguments for God's existence, but it
is not fair to scientists, who caution against committing oneself to causes that lack
objective verification.
Kierkegaard's confusion regarding "subjective truth," in Edwards' view, relates to
the fact that he does not have a single theory, but rather an amalgamation of theories,
which are inadequately differentiated from each other. This lack of clarity makes
it difficult to criticize the concept, even putting aside the question as to whether
it is really Kierkegaard's actual argument or only one put forth by an imaginary
character. "Perhaps," Edwards states,
we should begin by pointing out that although much of the time Kierkegaard appears

to tell us that we should forget about the objective questions except as a means of
heightening the tension Of inwardness, he does revert to these issues and as a Christian
he must do so. Putting it in different words, Kierkegaard reverts and must revert, from
the new sense of "true" in which to say that a belief is true means no more than that it
is held sincerely and without reservations, to the old sense in which it means that it is in
accordance with the facts or with reality. 23

So, when Kierkegaard speaks of "the truth of Christianity" he is not jettisoning
objectivity. It is crucial to him that Jesus really must be the son of God-it is not
enough that one just believes it to be so. The Incarnation would lose its importance
if it was simply a deeply held belief, and not a matter of fact.
At this point in the essay, Edwards has some fun by "resurrecting" none other
than his own hero, David Hume. Imagine a scenario in which Hume and Kierkegaard
both arrive at the Pearly Gates to be judged as to whether they deserve immortal
life: something Hume was skeptical about, and which Kierkegaard made the
centerpiece of his philosophical hopes. Suppose that God, rather than respecting
passionate commitment, prizes intellectual rectitude instead. Hume, therefore, while
not believing in God or eternal life, had based his beliefs upon the best available
evidence he had, and is rewarded with eternal bliss. But Kierkegaard is condemned
by God for concocting cowardly schemes to shield himself from the evidence before
him. "I very much doubt," Edwards writes, "that Kierkegaard would reply, 'I stand
vindicated. The fact that you are about to annihilate me and that unlike David Hume
I shall miss out on eternal happiness is of no importance. I believed what I did
without reservations. Hence I was in the truth. Hence I achieved the highest kind of
life. The rest is of no consequence."""
So, while Kierkegaard may praise inwardness and a lack of reservations as the
highest form of life, this does not have any actual bearing upon the truthfulness
23

24

Ibid., p. 97.
Ibid., p. 98.
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of one's beliefs. It is a value judgment, not a truth judgment. Furthermore, such
commitment is fully consistent with views that would have likely appalled
Kierkegaard. A follower of Ayn Rand, for instance, may demonstrate just as much
commitment to selfish capitalism. Sidney and Beatrice Webb demonstrated their
complete commitment to Socialism throughout their lives. Surely they were all
just as committed to their causes or beliefs as a Kierkegaardian Christian would
be to belief in the Incarnation. Such a "highest form of existence," therefore, is no
justification of the truths of Christianity per se. Indeed, Kierkegaard himselfrealizes
that the implications of appealing to sincerity can lead to utter chaos. Inwardness can
easily be equated with madness. Don Quixote, for example, was sincere in his beliefs
about giants. Kierkegaard distinguishes, therefore, between genuine versus aberrant
inwardness. The type of absnrdity he advocates is not congruent with delusions
of grandeur, or economic or political systems, no matter how utopian. Rather, for
Kierkegaard, commitment to the absnrd must be to the absolute, to the ultimate
meaning of existence, namely, eternal life. That would rule out Don Quixote, Ayn
Rand and the Webbs, since whatever the strength of their commitments, their focus
in not upon the ultimate. But even if one grants Kierkegaard such a distinction, there
are many other versions of the Savior and the Incarnation which are passionately
upheld by Christians and other theists who do have the ultimate as their aim. Is not
objective reality still the deciding factor as to which such belief one should commit
to, rather than which is most passionately adhered to?
Ultimately, then, Edwards holds, Kierkegaard is talking not about truth but about
commitment. And the only justifiable commitments are to propositions that are not
merely strongly felt but also are in accord with the facts. Thus, regardless of what
existentialists may claim, there is, after all, no new concept of truth found within

Kierkegaard's writings. At best, there is a new, or at least unconventional, analysis of
the meaning of"passion." At worst, there is a deliberate misuse of language. Rather
than offering a "new" meaning of truth, Kierkegaard merely gives us a misleading
redefinition, a "verbal fog." He is guilty of committing the age-old logical fallacy of
ignoratio elenchi (or "red herring"). Instead of leading us to a better understanding
of the meaning of truth, Kierkegaard and his advocates throw us off the scent. In
conclusion, Edwards writes: "We can now regard a person as in the truth if, in addition,
to feeling infinite concern, it is also the case that the object or objects appropriate to

this infinite concern do in fact exist. " 25 That is the only sort of existentialism to which
a pro-Positivist like Edwards would passionately commit himself.

III. Edwards and Kierkegaard
While "Kierkegaard and the 'Truth' of Christianity" remains the primary work by
which Edwards' criticism of Kierkegaard will be known, it is clear that he continued
to grapple with the thought and influence of Kierkegaard for many years thereafter.
Edwards' personal files, including his dictated notes (which he had typed up for
him and which he used in teaching his courses in philosophy) may be found in

lS

Ibid., p. 105.
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the archives at the Center for Inquiry in Amherst, New York. The Center is the
home of two publications founded by Edwards' friend Paul Kurtz (with whom he
once co-taught a course in philosophy at the New School for Social Research), The
Skeptical Inquirer and Free Inquiry. Unfortunately, while they are a rich resource of
materials, especially relating to the history and compilation of The Encyclopedia of
Philosophy, the Edwards' archives are not yet catalogued. I was able to do research
in the archives, under the auspices of Center for Inquiry archivist and chief librarian
Timothy Binga. While there, I found Edwards' files relating to Kierkegaard. Given
his obsessive working habits, it is not surprising that among these were several drafts
of "Kierkegaard and the 'Truth' of Christianity," as well as his rewrites of the article
which later appeared in various publications. All of the changes are fairly minor and
do not alter in any way the content of his criticisms. It was always Edwards' technique
to test his articles ahead of time by sending drafts to friends and fellow philosophers
for their opinions, and by discussing the works-in-progress with his students.
In the Edwards' archives at the Center for Inquiry there are also several files
labeled "Class Notes." In these, which Edwards used for the various courses he taught
over the years at Columbia University, New York University, Brooklyn College, and
the New School for Social Research, there are points he makes about Kierkegaard
which are either not found in any of his published writings or strengthen some of the
points he does make on the written page. Unfortunately, the notes are not dated, and
it is impossible to tell when they were delivered or how specifically he used them
in the classroom. Nonetheless, they should be of interest to those desiring further
information on Edwards' views about Kierkegaard as a philosopher. Below are some
of the choicest examples.
In relationship to Kierkegaard's views on sincerity of belief, Edwards notes:
Various Small Points Relating to K. In the exposition where K. has a good point about
people advocating a certain view which they themselves do not adequately feel or
believe in, like my friend when he praises the Jews-in this connection the word to use
is "it rings false in his mouth." This is exactly the right phrase and what I have now is
not very good.

Here Edwards comments upon a position of Kierkegaard's that he initially agrees
with, the concept of what constitutes a "true believer," although as usual he makes it
clear that he must ultimately part company with him:
On the point where K. is right-that what makes up a true believer are emotions and
actions rather than intellectual sophistication, something needs to be said as to why
he is right. I suppose in the long run all I can say is that this is the way in which we
normally use the word "belief' or "genuine belief' when it comes to belief in religions
or ideologies or anything else where not only verbal responses count (as they might in
the case of belief in certain metaphysical systems). Our chief criterion is not what a
person says or how intelligently he can support what he says, but how he acts and feels.
Edwards does express an ongoing desire not to overstate Kierkegaard's views
regarding the subjective nature of truth, and thereby portray him too much as a
strawman:
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I suppose I should watch out that I do not misrepresent K. in that "truth is subjectivity"
is a doctrine that is meant to apply only to religious, metaphysical and I assume moral
issues and not to straightforward empirical and scientific questions. That such a division
is not justified is in effect the main point of almost all of my objections, especially the
point concerning the misleading re-definition of"truth."

But, as always, he wants to take issue with what he feels to be !Gerkegaard 's
continuing misuse of language. Still, even Edwards is willing to concede that the
word ''truth" can be used in differing ways: "There is no doubt that 'truth' in the
philosophically most interesting sense of 'corresponding to fact' is not the only one
in everyday life. This in no way helps Kierkegaard or makes his various moves or
tricks any more defensible."
Nonetheless, Edwards in his notes to himself for classroom use stresses that his
criticisms of Kierkegaard are not trivial, and that in defining truth one must always
be cautious of falling into ambiguities:
It is important that when I write up some of the above comments I should emphasize
that these are not pedantic points, but they are quite central, especially the criticisms
of Kierkegaard and the various ambiguous uses of ••truth." All of this shows that being
clear about the meanings of word is not something trivial, but in philosophy at least
something extremely important and people who don't learn the art of attending to
redefinitions, linguistic shifts, etc. are apt to become the victims of their own or other
people's redefinitional games. I should also bring in as much of my material on James as
possible. This is the place-the two things are very similar and readers can be persuaded
more easily about the enormities of the Kierkegaard type of confusion when the same
sort of thing is demonstrated in James.

Here again one can see his conflating !Gerkegaard's "leap of faith" with William
James' concept of"The Will to Believe."
What seemed to primarily motivate Edwards' animus towards !Gerkegaard's
philosophy was what he considered to be a conflation between commitment to a
cause and the assumption that such commitmentjustijiedthe truth of the cause itself:
All of this needs to be done more clearly if at all. The main point is the contrast between
blind and informed commitments. In general I should point out that I am not opposed, in
suitable situations, to a person's giving himself entirely to a therapist, a doctor, a teacher,
a singer. No opposition to such complete giving is involved in my criticisms of K. I am
opposed to total giving in unsuitable situations-a movement like the Communist Party
or Christianity which has not been adequately investigated or as making this some sort
of argument for a baseless conclusion like the existence of God.

And in conclusion, while expressing some cautious admiration for Kierkegaard's
sincerity, Edwards distanced himself from what he felt to be the dark side of existential
commitment: the espousal of beliefs that were untenable or even atrocious:
Finally, though here one can do little more than express one's own feelings, I find certain
aspects of K. 's value-judgment quite horrifying. I will grant that sincerity is usually
admirable and that in certain contexts unreserved commitment is much to be preferred
to doubts and reservations (e.g. the way Churchill threw himself into the fight during the
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second World War) but I cannot see that this is necessarily and always the case. K. gives
us a blank check for any and every kind of fanaticism and, although he does not see this,
for the indulgence of any and every kind of intellectual and emotional cowardice.

As these notes demonstrate, Edwards remained fascinated by Kierkegaard,
particularly his psychological approach to philosophy. While he had no truck for
Kierkegaard's fideism or belief in eternal life, he does express grudging admiration
for Kierkegaard's zest for life ("I feel some sympathy," he writes in his classroom
notes, "for the yaluejudgments that are implicit in K-a life without passion doesn't
seem very worthwhile and a life in which a person doesn't deliberately decide and
allows himself to be driven by events is not the kind of life I admire").
There is one connection between the two thinkers which might otherwise go
unobserved: their shared puckish sense of humor. Edwards surely appreciated
Kierkegaard's use of laughter as a weapon. Most of all, just as Edwards used such
a weapon in his life-Jong campaign against Heidegger, he admired Kierkegaard's
similar campaign against Hegel, whom Edwards likewise considered a master of
obfuscation (or in Schopenhauer's memorable term "the intellectual Caliban"). 26 In
his files on Kierkegaard, Edwards saved the following quotation from Karl Popper:
Although Kierkegaard never freed himself entirely from the Hegelian tradition in which
he was educated, there was hardly anybody who recognized more clearly what Hegelian
historicism meant. ..There were," Kierkegaard wrote, "philosophers who tried, before
Hegel, to explain ...history. And providence could only smile when it saw these attempts.
But providence did not laugh outright, for there was a human, honest sincerity about
them. But Hegel? Here I need Homer's language. How did the gods roar with laughter!
Such a horrid little professor who has simply seen through the necessity of anything
and everything there is, and who now plays the whole affair on his barrel-organ: listen,
ye gods of Olympus!" And Kierkegaard continues, referring to the attack by the atheist
Schopenhauer upon the Christian apologist Hegel: "Reading Schopenhauer has given
me more pleasure than I can express. What he says is perfectly true: and then-it serves
the Germans right-he is rude as only a German can be." But Kierkegaard's own
expressions are nearly as blunt as Schopenhauer's: for Kierkegaard goes on to say that
Hegelianism, which he calls "this brilliant spirit of putridity,,. is the "most repugnant of
all forms of looseness": and he speaks of its "mildew of pomposity," its "intellectual
voluptuousness," and its "infamous splendour of corruption."27

Given Edwards' own Jove for blunt and often rude expressions, and his animus
toward the sort of writing style Hegel and the Hegelians exemplified, it is not
surprising that he adds "This is good stuff." On this issue, he and Smen Kierkegaard
were in passionate agreement.

26

Arthur Schopenhauer, Preface to the Second Edition, The World as Will and
Representation, vols. 1-2, trans. by E.F.J. Payne, New York: Dover Editions 1966-69, vol. 1,

p.xxi.
27

Karl R. Popper, The Open Society and Its Enemies, vols. 1-2, London: Routledge
1945, vol. 2, p. 275.
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